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The Definition and Determination of
Insanity in Colorado
by H. Patrick Furman
On a London street in early 1843,a young Scotsman named Dan-
iel M'Naghten shot Edward
Drummond, the personal sec-
retary of British Prime Minister Sir Rob-
ert Peel. The shot, fired in broad daylight
and within the view and hearing of a con-
stable, proved fatal. M'Naghten, who
thought that he was shooting the Prime
Minister himself, was laboring under a
delusional belief that the Prime Minis-
ter was a devil in human form who was
tormenting him and seeking his life.
M'Naghten was found not guilty by
reason of insanity. He was committed to
an insane asylum, where he spent the
rest of his unhappy days. Queen Victo-
ria, displeased by this verdict, asked the
common law judges of England to exam-
ine the defense of insanity. The results
of their deliberations came to be known
as the M'Naghten test.1
The M'Naghten test is the starting
point for any consideration of the insani-
ty defense. This article reviews the cur-
rent Colorado test and procedures used
to define and determine insanity.
Definition of Insanity
The current test for insanity in Colo-
rado, at CRS § 16-8-101(1), reads as fol-
lows:
A person who is so diseased or defec-
tive in mind at the time of the commis-
sion of the act as to be incapable of dis-
Column Ed.: H. Patrick Furman of
the University of Colorado School
of Law, Boulder-492-8126
tinguishing right from wrong with re-
spect to that act is not accountable. But
care should be taken not to confuse such
mental disease or defect with moral
obliquity, mental depravity, or passion
growing out of anger, revenge, hatred
or other motives, and kindred evil con-
ditions, for when the act is induced by
any of these causes the person is ac-
countable to the law.
The Colorado definition has been nar-
rowed significantly over the last decade.
Ten years ago, the definition of insanity
in Colorado included an "irresistible im-
pulse" component. Under the irresistible
impulse test at CRS § 16-8-101, a person
also was considered insane if-even
though able to distinguish right from
wrong-he or she was incapable, due to
a mental disease or defect, of choosing
the right and refraining from doing the
wrong. The irresistible impulse portion
of the definition was deleted in 1983.2
The Colorado Supreme Court recently
reviewed the definition of insanity in
People v. Serravo.3 This decision affirmed
a Court of Appeals decision, 4 although
on different grounds from those the low-
er court employed. A jury found the de-
fendant not guilty by reason of insanity
in connection with the stabbing of his
wife. The defendant was delusional about
having a mission from God to establish
a sports complex in Denver. He believed
that this "deific decree" required him to
sever his relationship with his wife, who
opposed his efforts to establish this sports
complex. He severed the relationship by
stabbing her in the back. The prosecu-
tion appealed the acquittal on a question
of law,5 arguing that the trial court im-
properly instructed the jury on the defi-
nition of insanity. At issue was the mean-
ing of the phrase "right from wrong."
Five psychiatrists and one psycholo-
gist testified about the defendant's sani-
ty. These experts disagreed on the pre-
cise diagnosis. Nevertheless, they all
agreed that the defendant believed his
actions were morally justified-that he
was morally "right." There was disagree-
ment as to whether he knew his actions
were illegal and were seen as "wrong" by
society.
The court had to determine from whose
viewpoint "right" and "wrong" would be
considered: that of the individual, of so-
ciety generally or of society as expressed
by positive law. The defendant argued
that right and wrong should be defined
by his own personal understanding of
those terms. The prosecution argued
that they should be defined by reference
to legal right and wrong. The court re-
jected both approaches and held that
the phrase ... refers to a cognitive
inability to distinguish right from
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wrong under existing societal stan-
dards of morality rather than... un-
der a purely subjective and personal
standard of morality.
6
The court noted that use of the prose-
cution's proposed definition-knowledge
that the act was illegal, rather than
knowledge that it was immoral-would
result in the acquittal of a person who
knew that his or her actions were pro-
foundly immoral but did not know that
they were prohibited by law. In the court's
view, this person should be considered
sane and liable for criminal acts. Con-
versely, the court noted that the prose-
cution's proposed definition would result
in the conviction of a person who knew
that his or her actions were prohibited
by law but did not have any comprehen-
sion of the profoundly immoral nature of
the acts. This person, the court said,
should not be held accountable under
the criminal law.
Under the test established by the
court,
a person may be considered legally
sane as long as the person commits an
act contrary to law and knows the act
is morally wrong without regard to
the person's actual knowledge of its
legality under positive law.
7
However, the court stated, it is unclear
how frequently this distinction actually
will make a difference because
knowledge that an act is forbidden by
law will in most cases permit the in-
ference of knowledge that, according
to the accepted standards of mankind,
it is also condemned as an offense
against good morals.'
The trial court instructed the jury
that the definition of insanity encom-
passes someone "who appreciates that
his conduct is criminal, but, because of a
mental disease or defect, believes it to
be morally right."9 The Court of Appeals
held that this instruction did not substi-
tute a subjective standard of morality
into the right-wrong test. 0 The Supreme
Court disagreed with this conclusion
and held that the jury should receive a
clarifying instruction stating that right
and wrong should be measured by a so-
cietal standard of morality. Despite the
fact that the trial court improperly in-
structed the Serravo jury, the Supreme
Court held that principles of double jeop-
ardy barred a retrial of the defendant on
the issue of sanity.
The Supreme Court also held that the
"deific decree" delusion-the belief that
God was ordering the commission of the
act-is not an exception to the right-
wrong test for legal insanity. However, it
is evidence that a defendant's
cognitive ability to distinguish right
from wrong with respect to an act
charged as a crime has been destroyed
as a result of a psychotic delusion that
God has ordered him to commit the
act.'
2
"The court had to determine
from whose viewpoint 'right'
and 'wrong' would be
considered: the individual's,
society's or the law's."
One justice dissented from all three
holdings of the court, arguing that the
statutory language compelled the con-
clusion that a defendant need only be
conscious that his or her conduct was
forbidden by law. The dissent also ar-
gued that the deific decree exception is
an improper subjective test which should
not be recognized either as an exception
or in the form adopted by the majority.
Finally, the dissenting justice would
have held that a retrial was not barred
on double jeopardy grounds because the
defendant was not put in jeopardy by a
sanity trial. He reasoned that such a tri-





Two variations of the traditional no-
tion of insanity are "temporary insanity"
and "settled insanity." The notion of tem-
porary insanity seems to have taken root
in the public discourse about insanity
but has no independent application in
Colorado. The notion of settled insanity
is far less well-known but is, for the mo-
ment at least, part of Colorado law.
The defendant in People v. Low14 did
not enter a plea of not guilty by reason
of insanity. However, at trial, the defen-
dant offered evidence that he had ingest-
ed a quantity of cold medication sufficient
to render him temporarily incapable of
distinguishing right from wrong. The tri-
al court accepted this evidence, held that
this evidence established the defendant
was temporarily insane and acquitted the
defendant.
The Court of Appeals disapproved the
acquittal, holding that "temporary in-
sanity is not part of the Colorado statu-
tory framework for resolving a criminal
defendant's nonresponsibility for a crim-
inal act .. ."15 The court held that the
defendant should have been required to
plead and prove insanity the same as oth-
er defendants who seek to excuse their
conduct by reason of insanity caused by
an ongoing mental disease or defect.
The settled insanity doctrine is based
on the premise that
an inability to distinguish between
right and wrong because of a mental
infirmity derived from excessive sub-
stance abuse should be recognized as
a form of legal insanity when the men-
tal infirmity persists after the effects
of the substance itself have dissipat-
ed. 
16
While intoxication does not, by itself, con-
stitute a mental disease or defect, the
settled insanity doctrine holds that per-
manent (or, at least, long term) mental
infirmity caused by intoxication may
constitute a mental disease or defect jus-
tifying a finding of insanity.
The Court of Appeals addressed the
viability of the settled insanity doctrine
in the recent case of People v. Bieber.
17
The defendant suffered from an atypical
psychotic disorder, the root of which
may have been long-term amphetamine
use. The trial court gave the jury the
standard definition of insanity and in-
structed them that intoxication does
not, in itself, constitute a mental disease
or defect. The trial court refused to give
the jury an instruction on settled insani-
ty which was proffered by the defen-
dant.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the
conviction. However, the three judges on
the Bieber panel issued three separate
opinions. The lead opinion held that the
settled insanity doctrine is not applica-
ble in Colorado because the mental dis-
order is based on the voluntary ingestion
of substances which, as a matter of com-
mon knowledge, people know are harm-
ful. Thus, in the court's view, moral blame
can be assigned to the long-term effects
of illegal drug use which cannot be as-
signed to a traditional mental disease or
defect. The concurring opinion was of
the view that settled insanity can be a
"disease or defect" within the meaning
of the Colorado statutory framework,
but that the instructions, as given, al-
lowed the defendant to argue this view
fairly to the jury. The dissenting opinion
agreed with the concurrence that settled
insanity is part of Colorado's statutory
framework, but would reverse the con-
viction on the grounds that the jury in-
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structions did not explain the doctrine
to the jury adequately.
The net result is that two of the three
Bieber judges consider settled insanity a
legitimate part of Colorado's statutory
framework, but only one believes that a
specific jury instruction on settled in-
sanity is required. At the time of this
writing, a petition for rehearing is pend-
ing in the Court of Appeals.
Overview of Procedure
The general procedure employed in
cases involving the insanity defense is
as follows. The defendant enters a plea
of not guilty by reason of insanity and is
examined by experts on the issue. A
sanity trial is then held. If the defen-
dant is found insane, he or she is com-
mitted indefinitely and is held until
found eligible for release. If the defen-
dant is found sane, a trial on the merits
of the charge is held. Acquittal or con-
viction at the trial on the merits oper-
ates just like any other acquittal or con-
viction.
Entering the Plea
A defendant raises the insanity de-
fense by pleading not guilty by reason of
insanity. This plea should be raised at
arraignment, although the trial court,
for good cause shown, may allow the
plea to be entered at any time prior to
trial.18 Such a plea is in the nature of con-
fession and avoidance. In other words,
the plea confesses the commission of the
prohibited act but seeks to avoid legal
responsibility on the ground of insan-
ity.1 9 However, an insanity plea also is
a plea on the merits because, in essence,
it attacks the mens rea element of the
charge.
20
A problem arises when counsel and
client disagree about whether an insani-
ty plea is appropriate. If counsel wishes
to enter the plea but the defendant does
not, counsel should inform the court of
the situation. The court then conducts
an investigation, including a psychiatric
examination, to determine whether en-
tering a plea of not guilty by reason of
insanity is necessary for a just determi-
nation of the charge. If the court deter-
mines that such a plea is necessary, it
enters the plea on behalf of the defen-
dant. The plea is treated as if it were en-
tered voluntarily by the defendant.
21
When counsel and client agree that a
plea of not guilty by reason of insanity
should not be entered, it is improper for
the trial court to enter that plea over their
objections.Y
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Under CRS § 16-8-103(4), before ac-
cepting a plea of not guilty by reason of
insanity, the trial court must advise the
defendant of the consequences of the
plea.
Pre-Trial Procedure
Once the plea has been entered, the
trial court orders a sanity examination
pursuant to CRS § 16-8-105(1). Most ex-
aminations take place at the Colorado
State Hospital in Pueblo, although the
statute is silent on the location of this
examination.
An issue arising with frequency in re-
cent years concerns the use of state-
ments made by the defendant during
the course of the sanity examination. A
typical examination includes questions
not only about the medical, family and
social history of the defendant, but also
about the crime for which the defendant
is charged. Such questions are necessary
because the issue is the sanity of the de-
fendant at the time the offense was com-
mitted.
Of course, statements the defendant
makes during the examination can be
used at the sanity trial because they are
an integral part of the examination it-
self. CRS § 16-8-106(2) recognizes the
danger of self-incrimination and pro-
vides that a defendant has a privilege
against self-incrimination during the
course of a sanity examination. Howev-
er, the statute also provides that the fact
a defendant exercised this privilege is
admissible at the sanity trial.23
It is a different issue when using such
statements at the trial on the merits of
the charge in order to establish the guilt
of the defendant. CRS § 16-8-107(1) pro-
vides that any evidence acquired from
the defendant's mental processes during
the examination is inadmissible at the
trial on the merits. That statute makes
an exception for evidence which is of-
fered at the trial on the merits to rebut
evidence of mental state or to impeach
or rebut the defendantfs testimony. Thus,
statements made during the course of a
sanity examination are treated like state-
ments made during a suppression hear-
ing.-2 they cannot be used in the prosecu-
tion's case in chief, but can be used for
certain types of rebuttal.
Precisely which statements are pro-
tected by these rules has been the sub-
ject of litigation. Clearly, statements
made to the examining psychiatrist or
Civil * Commerlal * Criminal inveatgai ons
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psychologist are protected by the stat-
ute.25 A recent ruling of the Colorado
Court of Appeals concerned statements
made by a defendant to, and in the pres-
ence of, a psychiatric social worker
while the defendant was at the State
Hospital undergoing a court-ordered
sanity examination. The court ruled
that the statements should not have
been admitted at the trial on the mer-
its. 26 This holding was based partly on
the social worker's testimony that it was
part of his job to interact with the pa-
tients and to report back to the doctors
any statements made by the patients.
The court held that the privilege codi-
fied at CRS § 16-8-107(1) should be in-
terpreted broadly to protect against un-
constitutional self-incrimination.
Trial Procedure
Under CRS § 16-8-106(4), when the san-
ity examination results are received, they
are given to the court and counsel. Then,
the matter is set for a trial at which the
issue is whether the defendant was sane
at the time the offense was committed.
Every defendant is presumed sane. The
defendant carries the burden of intro-
ducing evidence of insanity. Once such
evidence is introduced, the burden is on
the prosecution to prove sanity beyond a
reasonable doubt.
27
The statute allows defendants to waive
the right to a jury trial in all cases except
those involving Class 1, 2 or 3 felonies. In
those more serious cases, a waiver of a ju-
ry requires the consent of both the court
and the prosecutor.28 This restriction on
the right to waive a jury has been upheld
on the ground that, while a defendant
has a constitutional right to a jury trial,
a defendant does not have a constitution-
al right to a court trial. Thus, it is per-
missible for the legislature to place con-
ditions on obtaining a court trial.29
Expert opinions on sanity almost al-
ways are adduced by one or both parties
at a sanity trial. The normal rules for ex-
pert testimony apply. First, the expert
must be qualified. Then, the expert can
give an opinion on the facts in issue, in-
cluding the ultimate fact-the sanity of
the defendant. Finally, the facts on which
the expert bases the opinion need not be
admissible but must be revealed on cross-
examination.3o
Despite their general use by both par-
ties, experts are not the only witnesses
who can give opinions on the issue of san-
ity. Expert opinions are not conclusive
and should be weighed with any other
evidence presented. 3' Pursuant to CRS
§ 16-8-109, a layperson also may give an
opinion on sanity. The courts have read
this section, in conjunction with general
evidentiary principles, to require that a
foundation be laid for such testimony.
The evidentiary foundation necessary
to elicit a lay opinion is fairly straight-
forward. The witness must have had suf-
ficient opportunity to observe the person
whose sanity is at issue, so that the wit-
ness's opinion about that person's men-
tal state is reliable. This foundation has
been described as evidence that the wit-
ness had an adequate means of becom-
ing acquainted with the person and had
contacts with the person proximate in
time to the alleged offense.32 For exam-
ple, it has been held that a defendant's
mother should be allowed to offer an opin-
ion as to the sanity of her son when it
was established that he had lived with
her until about three months before the
commission of the offense. 33
As is usually the case with eviden-
tiary rulings, the trial court has broad
discretion in determining whether the
foundation has been laid.34 However, a
failure to lay the proper foundation ren-
ders a lay opinion inadmissible. 35 Even
with a proper foundation, a lay witness
cannot answer hypothetical questions
about sanity.
3 6
The defendant is entitled to a jury in-
struction informing the jury of the com-
mitment procedures which will be used
if the verdict is insanity.37 This instruc-
tion is for information only and should
not directly bear on the verdict.38 As a
practical matter, this instruction helps
guard against the possibility that a jury
may believe that a defendant who is ac-
quitted by reason of insanity simply will
be released and that the jury will find
the defendant sane to avoid that possi-
bility.
If the defendant is found sane, the case
proceeds to a trial on the merits or other
disposition. Defense counsel still may in-
troduce evidence-at the trial on the mer-
its-that the defendant, because of a men-
tal disease or defect, did not act with the
requisite degree of culpability.39 Such evi-
dence also may be used in mitigation of
any sentence imposed following a con-
viction on the merits.4°
Under CRS § 16-8-105(4), if the defen-
dant is found not guilty by reason of in-
sanity, the defendant is committed to the
custody of the executive director of the
Department of Institutions until he or
she is deemed eligible for release. This
commitment is for the purpose of treat-
ment, not punishment.41 CRS § 16-8-105
(4) also gives the executive director the
authority to place the defendant in the
appropriate institution.
The trial court which commits a de-
fendant following such a verdict retains
some jurisdiction over the defendant.
For example, the Colorado Supreme Court
has held that the trial court retains ju-
risdiction to hear a motion to authorize
the administration of anti-psychotic




Just as the definition of insanity has
changed over the years, the definition of
who is eligible for release from commit-
ment following an adjudication of insan-
ity has changed. The current test for re-
lease, found in CRS § 16-8-120(3), is
ithat the defendant has no abnormal
mental condition which would be like-
ly to cause him to be dangerous either
to himself or others or to the commu-
nity in the reasonably foreseeable fu-
ture, and is capable of distinguishing
right from wrong and has substantial
capacity to conform his conduct to re-
quirements of law.
Persons committed for crimes occurring
before July 1, 1983, are subject to a dif-
ferent, broader release standard at CRS
§ 16-8-120(1)(2).
This issue is determined at the re-
lease hearing. The court, the prosecutor
or the defendant may seek a release
hearing. With some exceptions, the de-
fendant is entitled to only one release
hearing per year.43 With the exception of
the first request for a hearing, a defen-
dant requesting a release hearing must
offer proof of eligibility by obtaining ex-
pert testimony in support of release.4
If the request for a release hearing is
granted, the defendant may have the is-
sue determined by a jury of six or by the
court. Once any evidence of insanity is
introduced at the hearing, the defendant
has the burden of proving a restoration
to sanity by a preponderance of the evi-
dence.4
Pursuant to CRS § 16-8-115(3)(a), if
the jury or court finds the defendant eli-
gible for release, the trial court has the
power to place conditions on the release.
The defendant is entitled to present to
the jury evidence about what conditions
might be placed on the release, even
though the jury does not determine
those conditions." In this way, the jury
is better informed about the supervision
which still would be maintained follow-
ing the release of the defendant.
47
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When a defendant is released condi-
tionally, the DOI retains jurisdiction to
monitor compliance with the conditions
and is required to report periodically to
the district attorney concerning the de-
fendant's status. Under CRS § 16-8-115
(3), the trial court also must review the
status of a conditionally released defen-
dant at least every twelve months.
The procedure for revoking a condi-
tional release also is governed by stat-
ute. Anyone who has reason to believe
the defendant has violated a conditional
release may report it to an appropriate
authority and set the revocation process
in motion. Whenever the state has prob-
able cause to believe that a conditional
release should be revoked, the prosecu-
tor may apply for a warrant to take the
defendant into custody or proceed by
way of a summons. Once the defendant
is in custody, a petition for revocation of
the conditional release must be filed
within seventy-two hours, unless good
cause is shown for an extension."
The defendant is entitled to a prelimi-
nary hearing within seventy-two hours
of arrest or first appearance pursuant to
summons. However, this hearing may
be continued for up to five days on a show-
ing of good cause. A finding that no prob-
able cause for revocation exists mandates
release. Conversely, a finding that prob-
able cause does exist requires a tempo-
rary revocation and recommitment, pend-
ing the final hearing. The final hearing
on revocation must be held within thirty
days of the preliminary hearing. While
the rules of evidence are relaxed signifi-
cantly in this procedure, the defendant
does have the right to call, confront and
cross-examine witnesses.
49
CRS § 16-8-115.5(8) places the burden
at the final hearing on the prosecution
to prove, by a preponderance of the evi-
dence, that the defendant has become
ineligible to remain on conditional re-
lease. This does not mean the court has
to find that the defendant is dangerous.
The court need only find that there has
been a violation of the terms and condi-
tions of the conditional release.50 If the
defendant is found ineligible to remain
on conditional release, the court recom-
mits the defendant. A finding that the bur-
den on this issue has not been met requires
release on the same or modified condi-
tions.5 1
Conclusion
The question of who should be excused
from responsibility for criminal conduct
by reason of insanity is a reminder that
there are no easy answers to some of the
fundamental questions of criminal law.
Nearly 150 years after the common law
judges of England addressed the issue of
insanity in the M'Naghten case, practi-
tioners still struggle to find an appropri-
ate definition of insanity and to apply
that definition to the difficult problems
posed by persons with mental health
problems who run afoul of the criminal
justice system.
Even the best test and the most fair
procedure have a significant limitation:
they can determine only criminal culpa-
bility. The real solutions to mental health
problems must come from a concerted
effort by those in both the criminal jus-
tice and mental health arenas. Still,
some behavior, like that revealed in the
recent trial of Jeffrey Dahmer, will re-
main beyond society's capacity to under-
stand and explain.
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